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Domestic Relations
By Andrew B. McClintock*
Allison C. Ellison**
This Article addresses significant case law and legislative updates to
Georgia domestic relations law that arose during the Survey period from
June 1, 2020 through May 31, 2021.1 Notably, this period includes the
state of emergency declared by the Governor2 and statewide judicial
emergency declared by Chief Justice Harold D. Melton3 on March 14,
2020, in response to the outbreak of the novel coronavirus (COVID-19) in
the state of Georgia during the first quarter of 2020. The majority of
litigation deadlines were reinstated effective July 13, 2020, as part of the
Fourth Order Extending Statewide Judicial Emergency issued by the
Supreme Court of Georgia on July 10, 2020.4 The statewide judicial
emergency remained in effect at the end of the Survey period, but it is

*Associate, Warner Bates. University of Georgia (B.A. 2012); University of Georgia School
of Law (J.D., 2016). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
**Associate, Kaye, Lembeck, Hitt, & French Family Law, LLC. University of Georgia (B.S,
B.A., 2011); Georgia State University College of Law (J.D., 2018). Member, State Bar of
Georgia.
1. For an analysis of Georgia domestic relations law updates during the prior Survey
period, see Andrew B. McClintock, Allison C. Kessler, Barry B. McGough, & Elinor H. Hitt,
Domestic Relations, Annual Survey of Georgia Law, 72 MERCER L. REV. 97 (2020).
2. Ga. Exec. Order 03.14.20.01: Declaration of Public Health State of Emergency
(March 14, 2020), available online at https://gov.georgia.gov/executive-action/executiveorders/2020-executive-orders; Renewed with revisions on April 8, 2020; April 30, 2020; and
May 28, 2020.
3. Order Declaring Statewide Judicial Emergency, S. Ct. of Ga. (March 14, 2020),
available online at https://www.gasupreme.us/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/CJ-Meltonamended-Statewide-Jud-Emergency-order.pdf; Extended with revisions on April 6, 2020
and May 11, 2020.
4. Fourth Order Extending Declaration of Statewide Judicial Emergency, S. Ct. of Ga.
(July
10,
2020),
available
online
at
https://www.gasupreme.us/wpcontent/uploads/2020/07/4th-SJEO-FINAL.pdf.
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anticipated that it the statewide judicial emergency will expire on June
30, 2021.5
I. ALIMONY
In Angst v. Augustine,6 the Georgia Court of Appeals reversed the
Dekalb County Superior Court’s order dismissing the former husband’s
petition to modify his alimony obligation.7 The pertinent section of the
parties’ settlement agreement provided that the husband would pay the
wife $5,652.33 in alimony per month for a period of ten years and would
cease after the 120th month. The settlement agreement also contained a
provision stating that the parties agreed not to waive their rights to seek
a statutory modification of alimony. When the former husband lost his
job, he filed a petition to modify alimony based upon the change in his
income.8
The trial court granted the wife’s motion to dismiss the petition for
modification of alimony on the grounds that the settlement agreement
established a lump sum alimony obligation.9 An alimony obligation which
“states the exact number and amount of payments without other
limitations, conditions, or statements of intent”10 is considered “lump
sum” alimony, whereas an alimony obligation that is “contingent and
[where the total sum] cannot be determined at present” is considered
“periodic” alimony.11 “[O]nly periodic alimony is subject to
modification.”12 The trial court determined that because there was no
limitation or condition upon the alimony obligation, and the total sum to
be paid over a definite period was determinable, the obligation for lump
sum alimony was not subject to modification. This was error.
Applying principles of contract construction and interpretation, the
court of appeals determined that the parties’ express retention of the
right to seek modification was sufficient to render the alimony obligation
uncertain (and thus periodic, rather than lump sum), because it might be

5. Fifteenth Order Extending Declaration of Statewide Judicial Emergency, S. Ct. of
Ga.
(June
7,
2021),
available
online
at
https://www.gasupreme.us/wpcontent/uploads/2021/06/15th-SJEO_as-issued.pdf.
6. 356 Ga. App. 402, 847 S.E.2d 392 (2020).
7. Id. at 402, 847 S.E.2d at 392.
8. Id. at 403, 847 S.E.2d at 393.
9. Id.
10. Id. (quoting Dillard v. Dillard, 265 Ga. 478, 479, 458 S.E.2d 102, 103 (1995)).
11. Id.
12. Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 19-6-21 (2021); Rivera v. Rivera, 283 Ga. 547, 549, 661 S.E.2d
541, 543 (2008)).
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modified or terminated upon statutory grounds.13 To hold otherwise
would render the reservation of the right to seek modification void, which
would be contrary to principles of construction favoring upholding
agreements in their entirety.14
II. EQUITABLE DIVISION OF PROPERTY
In Calloway-Spencer v. Spencer,15 the wife purchased a townhome
shortly before the parties began dating.16 The parties later resided at the
townhome and contributed significant marital funds towards the
mortgage and repairs, but the townhome remained titled in the wife’s
name. The Fulton County Superior Court classified the townhome as a
gift to the marriage, which the Georgia Court of Appeals found to be
error.17 Because the wife did not manifest intent to convert the separate
asset into a joint asset through an action such as “transferring [ ] full,
partial, or joint ownership” in the townhome to the husband, the trial
court should have applied the “source of funds rule” to determine what
percentage of the equity in the house was attributable to marital efforts
and what percentage remained the wife’s separate property.18
The wife in Daniel v. Daniel19 appealed the portion of the Monroe
County Superior Court’s decision awarding the former marital residence
to the husband and wife as tenants-in-common.20 The wife was granted
exclusive use and possession of the residence until the youngest child
turned eighteen. Further, the trial court’s decision obligated the parties
to split the taxes, mortgage, and insurance. The Georgia Court of Appeals
affirmed this portion of the trial court’s decision, finding that it properly
considered the evidence presented regarding ownership of the former
marital residence.21 Tenancy-in-common may be created through a
divorce decree under Georgia law. “[T]he trial court has broad discretion
to fashion a remedy suitable to the parties involved,” as long as it has
properly considered the evidence.22

13. Id. at 404, 847 S.E.2d at 394 (citing Shepherd v. Collins, 283 Ga. 124, 125, 657
S.E.2d 197, 199 (2008)).
14. Id. at 404, 847 S.E.2d at 393 (citing O.C.G.A §§ 19-6-19, 19-6-21, 13-2-2 (2021)).
15. 355 Ga. App. 743, 845 S.E.2d 715 (2020).
16. Id. at 743, 845 S.E.2d at 717.
17. Id. at 744–45, 845 S.E.2d at 718–19.
18. Id. at 745, 845 S.E.2d at 718–19.
19. 358 Ga. App. 880, 856 S.E.2d 452 (2021).
20. Id. at 880, 856 S.E.2d at 456.
21. Id. at 881, 856 S.E.2d at 457.
22. Id. at 890, 856 S.E.2d at 462.
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Jurisdiction and choice of law were explored by the Georgia Court of
Appeals in Mbatha v. Cutting.23 Cutting resided in New York when she
traveled to South Africa and met Mbatha. The parties had a brief
relationship, resulting in Cutting becoming pregnant. They married in a
civil ceremony in New York in January 2018, then traveled on a monthlong honeymoon, during which the relationship crumbled. The parties
separated, and Cutting moved to Georgia to live with her parents until
the child was born in September 2018 while Mbatha remained in South
Africa.24
A disagreement arose between the parties, due to their various
residences, as to which jurisdiction’s law would govern the division of
marital property.25 The Forsyth County Superior Court initially applied
the rule of lex loci contractus, which Georgia courts traditionally apply to
questions of law in contract disputes.26 This doctrine looks to the law of
the place where the contract was made, unless it is specified in the
contract that the law of another state should apply. The trial court
determined, under that rule, that New York choice-of-law rules should
apply because the parties married in New York.27 This was error.
Instead, “a Georgia court should apply Georgia’s approach in a conflictof-law analysis.”28 As the court of appeals explained, Georgia follows the
rule of lex loci contractus in contract disputes and the rule of lex loci
delictis in tort cases—under which the law of the place where the tort
occurred governs the choice of law.29 However, the court of appeals
determined that Georgia should follow the traditional approach to choiceof-law with respect to property division: “the parties’ interests in any real
property should be determined under the law of the jurisdiction where it
is located while interests in personal property should be determined
under the law of the owner’s domicile at the time the property was
acquired.”30
23. 356 Ga. App. 743, 848 S.E.2d 920 (2020).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 744, 856 S.E.2d at 922.
26. Id. at 749, 856 S.E.2d at 925.
27. Id. (citing Matter of Liquidation of Midland Ins. Co., 16 N.Y.3d 536, 543 (2011)).
28. Id. at 750, 856 S.E.2d at 925 (quoting S. Guar. Ins. Co. v. Cent. Mut. Ins. Co., 214
Ga. App. 662, 662, 449 S.E.2d 3 (1994)).
29. Id. at 750, 856 S.E.2d at 926 (citing Farm Credit of Nw. Fla. v. Easom Peanut Co.,
312 Ga. App. 374, 381, 718 S.E.2d 590, 600 (2011); Intl. Bus. Machs. Corp. v. Kemp, 244
Ga. App. 638, 641, 536 S.E.2d 303, 307 (2000)).
30. Id. at 750–51, 856 S.E.2d at 926–27 (citing Dowis v. Mudslingers, Inc., 279 Ga. 808,
816, 621 S.E.2d 413, 419 (2005); Convergys Corp. v. Keener, 276 Ga. 808, 812, 582 S.E.2d
84, 87 (2003); Gen. Tel. Co. of Se. v. Trimm, 252 Ga. 95, 96, 311 S.E.2d 460, 462 (1984)); see
O.C.G.A. § 19-2-1 (2021).
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The parties in Messick v. Messick31 separated, settled all issues
between them, and executed a settlement agreement. After the divorce
petition was filed, but before the final judgment and decree of divorce
were entered, Ms. Messick won a significant amount of money in a
lottery. Ms. Messick moved to enforce the settlement agreement entered
prior to the win; Mr. Messick moved to set the agreement aside, arguing
that the winnings were subject to equitable division because the
winnings were obtained during the marriage. The Ben Hill County
Superior Court denied Ms. Messick’s request to enforce the settlement
agreement and set it aside due to its failure to address the lottery
proceeds. The agreement did not contemplate division of lottery proceeds
received before the decree was entered; therefore, the agreement did not
dispose of all marital property, and thus could not be incorporated into
the final judgment and decree. The Georgia Court of Appeals affirmed
the trial court’s ruling.32
III. PATERNITY AND LEGITIMATION
Three noteworthy cases during the Survey period examined the
standards for a biological father’s abandonment of opportunity interest
in forming a relationship with his child.
First, in Westbrook v. Eidys,33 the parties were unwed parents with
one shared child. Eidys sought to legitimate when the child in question
was approximately ten-years-old. The evidence showed that Westbrook
had consistently impeded Eidys’ efforts to spend time with the child,
including, but not limited to, informing Eidys’ mother of her address but
forbidding the mother from communicating the same to Eidys; moving to
Mexico for two years without informing Eidys; requiring supervised
visitation; and moving to Washington state after the filing of the
legitimation petition. The Camden County Superior Court granted the
petition for legitimation, citing that Eidys was current on all child
support and that Westbrook had prevented Eidys from communicating
with the child. Eidys was awarded joint legal custody and specified
visitation. Westbrook appealed.34
The Georgia Court of Appeals held that the trial court had made the
decision to legitimate the child based on some evidence, and therefore it
did not err.35 However, the trial court failed to consider whether the
legitimation and subsequent custody arrangement was in the best
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

359 Ga. App. 481, 858 S.E.2d 758 (2021).
Id.
356 Ga. App. 619, 848 S.E.2d 660 (2020).
Id. at 621, 848 S.E.2d at 663.
Id. at 621–22, 848 S.E.2d at 663.
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interests of the child.36 Thus, the case was remanded with direction to
consider the best interests of the child.37
The Georgia Court of Appeals issued an opinion in Brumbelow v.
Mathenia38 after the Supreme Court of Georgia reversed its decision in
Mathenia v. Brumbelow,39 released during the last Survey period.40 The
Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari on two elements of the case:
whether the Habersham Superior Court’s decision that Brumbelow
abandoned his opportunity interest was correct, and whether the court of
appeals used the proper standard—parental fitness, rather than the best
interests of the child—for evaluating a legitimation petition.41 The
supreme court held that the superior court did not abuse its discretion in
dismissing Brumbelow’s original petition, as it was supported by
evidence.42 Additionally, it held that portions of the court of appeals
decisions must be viewed as dicta only.43
The Georgia Supreme Court explained that the court of appeals erred
by considering evidence that the superior court had not mentioned in its
final order.44 The evidence, as considered by the superior court, is as
follows: Mathenia and Brumbelow had a one-time sexual encounter while
Mathenia was married to another man. Mathenia informed Brumbelow
that Mathenia was pregnant, and Brumbelow attended a doctor’s
appointment with her. Brumbelow then offered Mathenia money for an
abortion, which Mathenia refused. Mathenia gave the child up for
adoption and surrendered her parental rights, and the child remained
with the adoptive parents throughout the pendency of the case. A few
weeks after the child was born, Brumbelow’s mother contacted Mathenia,
and a meeting was scheduled at an attorney’s office. Brumbelow first
requested visitation at the attorney’s office.45
The factors considered by the superior court when dismissing
Brumbelow’s legitimation petition, and highlighted by the supreme
court, include the following: (1) Brumbelow did not offer Mathenia any

36. Id. at 623, 848 S.E.2d at 664.
37. Id. at 624, 848 S.E.2d at 665.
38. 358 Ga. App. 404, 855 S.E.2d 425 (2021).
39. 308 Ga. 714, 843 S.E.2d 582 (2020).
40. Id. The first appeal of this case, Brumbelow v. Mathenia, 347 Ga. App. 861, 819
S.E.2d 535 (2018) was discussed in the article titled: Domestic Relations, Annual Survey of
Georgia Law of the Period from June 1, 2018, through May 31, 2019.
41. 308 Ga. at 714–15, 843 S.E.2d at 584.
42. Id. at 715, 843 S.E.2d at 584.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 715, 843 S.E.2d at 585.
45. Id. at 717–18, 843 S.E.2d at 586.
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financial support during the pregnancy or first few weeks of the child’s
life, other than to offer to pay for an abortion; (2) Brumbelow did nothing
else to support Mathenia during the pregnancy, despite having the
ability to contact her; and (3) Brumbelow’s mother made contact with
Mathenia after the child’s birth and set up the meeting, rather than
Brumbelow himself.46 The supreme court determined that “Brumbelow
showed no interest in ‘becoming a father in a true relational sense.’”47
Therefore, the superior court’s decision to deny his petition for
legitimation was supported by evidence.48 “The Court of Appeals erred in
concluding otherwise.”49
The Georgia Supreme Court briefly discussed the “potential tension”
between In re Baby Girl Eason50 and O.C.G.A. § 19-7-22(d)(1)51. The
court’s decision in Eason stands for the proposition that, “if an unwed
biological father has not abandoned his opportunity interest, he has a
constitutional right to obtain custody of his child over individuals who
are strangers to the child and who seek to adopt unless the biological
father is deemed unfit.”52 However, O.C.G.A. § 19-7-22(d)(1) was
amended in 2016 to require the “best interests of the child” test to be
considered in each legitimation case.53 Accordingly, there is “significant
doubt” regarding the constitutionality of O.C.G.A § 19-7-22(d)(1) in cases
where the “fit parent” standard must be applied in accordance with an
unwed father’s constitutional rights.54 Although this lingering question
was discussed by the supreme court, the opinion states that it will wait
until the issue is properly presented to fully address same.55
In the court of appeals’ 2021 decision subsequent to the supreme
court’s decision, Presiding Judge Dillard concurred dubitante. Judge
Dillard asserted his belief that the court of appeals’ decision in
Brumbelow v. Mathenia56 was correct, and the supreme court has
“significantly diminished the constitutional rights of unwed biological
46. Id. at 721–22, 843 S.E.2d at 588–89.
47. Id. at 722, 843 S.E.2d at 589 (quoting In re Baby Girl Eason, 257 Ga. 292, 296, 358
S.E.2d 439, 462 (1987)).
48. Id. at 723, 843 S.E.2d at 589.
49. Id. at 723, 843 S.E.2d at 590.
50. 257 Ga. 292, 358 S.E.2d 439 (1987).
51. O.C.G.A. § 19-7-22(d)(1) (2021); Mathenia, 308 Ga. at 725, 843 S.E.2d at 591.
52. Mathenia, 308 Ga. at 724, 843 S.E.2d at 590 (citing Eason, 257 Ga. at 297, 358
S.E.2d at 463).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 724, 843 S.E.2d at 591.
55. Id. at 725, 843 S.E.2d at 591 (citing State v. Hudson, 303 Ga. 348, 350, 812 S.E.2d
270, 272 (2018)).
56. 347 Ga. App. 861, 819 S.E.2d 535 (2018).
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fathers in Georgia and made it far more difficult for many of them to
preserve their opportunity interest in a natural parent-child
relationship.”57
In Belliveau v. Floyd,58 Evelyn and Daniel Belliveau were married.
While the parties were separated, but still married, Evelyn had a
relationship with Floyd, resulting in a child being born.59 Floyd was
present at the birth and listed on the birth certificate. Further, Evelyn
and Floyd executed a notarized paternity acknowledgement. Evelyn and
Floyd lived together for a period of roughly six months after the child was
born, but the Belliveaus ultimately reconciled and the child began living
with them full time.60
Daniel Belliveau was declared the legal father of the child due to the
fact that the birth occurred during the Belliveau’s marriage.61 Floyd filed
a petition for legitimation when the child was roughly one-year-old.
Genetic testing was completed after the filing, confirming that Floyd was
the child’s biological father. On appeal, the Georgia Court of Appeals held
the Chatham County Superior Court did not err by ordering genetic
testing without first determining it was in the best interests of the
child.62 O.C.G.A. § 19-7-22(h) grants express statutory authority to do so
as part of considering whether legitimation is in the best interests of the
child.63
During the pendency of the case, the trial court scheduled an
evidentiary hearing, but ultimately did not conduct the hearing.64 Based
on its review of affidavits, briefs, and the guardian ad litem report, the
trial court granted Floyd’s petition for legitimation, then terminated
Daniel Belliveau’s parental rights to the child. The court of appeals
reversed this portion of the decision.65 O.C.G.A. § 19-7-22(d)(1) provides
that, “after a hearing for which notice was provided to all interested
parties,” a court may find a biological father to be the legitimate father
of a child, “provided that such order is in the best interests of the
child[.]”66 Accordingly, the trial erred by not conducting a hearing on the

57. Brumbelow, 358 Ga. App. at 405, 855 S.E.2d at 425.
58. 359 Ga. App. 475, 858 S.E.2d 763 (2021).
59. Id. at 475, 858 S.E.2d at 764.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 475, 858 S.E.2d at 764 (citing Baker v. Baker, 276 Ga. 778, 779, 582 S.E.2d
102, 103 (2003)).
62. Id. at 476, 858 S.E.2d at 765.
63. Id. (citing O.C.G.A § 19-7-22(h) (2021)).
64. Id. at 478, 858 S.E.2d at 766.
65. Id. at 478, 858 S.E.2d at 766.
66. Id. at 477, 858 S.E.2d at 765 (citing O.C.G.A § 19-7-22(d)(1) (2021)).
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matter and relying on affidavits, briefs, and the guardian ad litem
report.67
The trial court also did not directly consider whether the biological
father had abandoned his opportunity interest in forming a relationship
with the child. The trial court stated that the issue was not in front of it
at the time, but that if it were, Floyd had not abandoned his opportunity
interest.68 However, the lack of evidentiary hearing prohibited the trial
court from hearing the proper evidence to make such a determination.
Lastly, while the court of appeals did not rule on the Belliveau’s
argument that the trial court must determine whether delegitimizing a
legal father is in the child’s best interest before analyzing whether
legitimizing the biological father is in the child’s best interests, the court
of appeals did note that “the Supreme Court of Georgia has held that ‘[t]o
grant [a] legitimation petition require[s] the superior court to first
terminate the parental rights of the legal father.’”69
IV. CHILD SUPPORT
In Cousin v. Tubbs (Cousin II),70 the Georgia Court of Appeals heard
a second appeal following the remand of its 2020 decision in Cousin v.
Tubbs (Cousin I)71 to the Paulding County Superior Court. In the first
appearance of the case before the court of appeals, the court vacated and
remanded the child support provisions of the parties’ final judgment and
decree of divorce based upon the trial court’s improper application of a
“high income” child support deviation.72 The trial court initially entered
a high-income deviation requiring the husband to pay to the wife
approximately 18% of his gross monthly income. The court of appeals
analyzed the statutory child support guidelines and the “regressive
sliding scale”73 mechanic employed by the legislature, which caps
presumptive support obligations at 7.5% of the parties’ monthly income
for the maximum statutory income bracket of $30,000, and determined
that the magnitude of the 18% obligation imposed was so inconsistent
with the statutory cap of 7.5% that it appeared punitive and rose to the
level of reversible error.74 The court of appeals directed the trial court, on

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id.
Id. at 479, 858 S.E.2d at 767.
Id. at 480, 858 S.E.2d at 767.
358 Ga. App. 722, 856 S.E.2d 56 (2021).
353 Ga. App. 873, 840 S.E.2d 85 (2020).
Id. at 873, 840 S.E.2d at 89.
Id. at 889, 840 S.E.2d at 100 (citing O.C.G.A. § 19-6-15(o) (2021)).
Id. at 889–91, 840 S.E.2d at 100–01.
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remand, to recalculate the deviation consistent with the legislature’s
guidelines.75
In Cousin II, the husband appealed the trial court’s refusal to order
reimbursement for child support payments he made during the pendency
of Cousin I.76 He argued that, in light of the court of appeals’ decision to
vacate the initial child support award, the payments he had been
required to make thereunder were void and contrary to law. However,
the parties entered into a consent order during the pendency of the first
appeal which provided that the husband would continue to pay the sums
due under the initial order.77 Thus, in the absence of fraud or mistake in
the procurement of the consent order, it was proper for the trial court to
require the husband to abide by its terms and the trial court was within
its discretion in denying the requested reimbursement.78 The court of
appeals emphasized that, while it did not intend to discourage litigants
from utilizing consent judgments to resolve disputes, it is incumbent
upon the parties to ensure that such agreements are “drafted with care
to protect [their] interests.”79
In Day v. Mason,80 the father challenged an order awarding to the
mother, among other things, back child support and a pro rata share of
future extracurricular expenses for the minor child after the
establishment of paternity, and a subsequent order awarding her
attorney’s fees to litigate the appeal.81 The Cobb County Superior Court
ultimately ordered the father to pay half of the back childcare expenses
incurred by the mother before the establishment of paternity and
attorney’s fees under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-3782 and O.C.G.A. § 19-9-3(g).83 The
father appealed, and during the pendency of that appeal, the mother
applied to the trial court for an award of additional attorney’s fees to
enable her to litigate the appeal.84 The trial court awarded the mother
additional fees under O.C.G.A. § 19-9-3(g) “in anticipation of defending
the pending appeal.” The father appealed that order as well.85 On review,

75. Id. at 891, 840 S.E. 2d at 101.
76. 358 Ga. App. at 722, 856 S.E.2d at 57.
77. Id. at 724, 856 S.E.2d at 58.
78. Id. at 725–26, 856 S.E.2d at 59 (citing Hurt v. Norwest Mortgage, 260 Ga. App. 651,
656–57, 580 S.E.2d 580, 584 (2003)).
79. Id. at 726, 856 S.E.2d at 59, n.5.
80. 357 Ga. App. 836, 851 S.E.2d 825 (2020).
81. Id. at 836–37, 851 S.E.2d at 827.
82. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-37 (2021).
83. Day, 357 Ga. App. at 839, 851 S.E.2d at 828; O.C.G.A. § 19-9-3(g) (2021).
84. Day, 357 Ga. App. at 839, 851 S.E.2d at 828.
85. Id.
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the court of appeals vacated the awards of back child support and
attorney’s fees under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-37 and reversed the awards of
future extracurricular expenses and appellate attorney’s fees under
O.C.G.A. § 19-9-3(g).86
First, while a mother may recover as back child support the reasonable
and necessary expenses incurred in raising a child prior to an order
establishing a child support obligation, the trial court’s order requiring
the father to pay half of all such costs failed to comply with the statutory
Child Support Guidelines.87 The court of appeals was required to vacate
and remand it.88 In doing so, however, the court of appeals rejected the
father’s argument that his voluntary payments of partial support before
the establishment of paternity precluded the trial court from awarding
back support.89 Instead, the trial court is vested with discretion to
determine, based upon the facts and the evidence, whether an award of
back support is appropriate.90 Noncompliance with the Child Support
Guidelines also required that the award of future extracurricular activity
expenses be reversed.91 The trial court may only enter a deviation for
additional extracurricular expenses if the trial court is shown that the
actual extracurricular expenses for the child exceed 7% of the
presumptive obligation—in which case the court may enter a “special
expenses deviation” to cover the full amount of the extracurricular
activities.92 The trial court’s order requiring the father to pay 50% of all
extracurricular expenses did not contain the required findings and thus
did not comply with the statutory requirements, requiring reversal.93
Finally, the court of appeals held as an apparent issue of first
impression that O.C.G.A. § 19-9-3(g) does not authorize an award of
attorney’s fees during the pendency of an appeal in a child custody case.94
Because attorney’s fees are generally not authorized except as permitted
by agreement or by statute, “whether a statute that authorizes an award
of attorney fees also includes an award of appellate fees depends on the

86. Id. at 837, 851 S.E.2d at 827.
87. Id. at 839, 851 S.E.2d at 828 (citing Weaver v. Chester, 195 Ga. App. 471, 393
S.E.2d 715 (1990); Smith v. Carter, 305 Ga. App. 479, 482, 699 S.E.2d 796, 798 (2010)).
88. Id. (citing Medley v. Mosley, 334 Ga. App. 589, 594(3), 780 S.E.2d 31 (2015)).
89. Id. at 840, 851 S.E.2d 829 (citing Bridger v. Franze, 348 Ga. App. 227, 280 S.E.2d
223 (2018)).
90. Id. (citing Bridger, 348 Ga. App. at 233, 820 S.E.2d at 230).
91. Id. at 841, 851 S.E.2d at 829–30 (citing O.C.G.A § 19-6-15(c)(6) (2021); Holloway v.
Holloway, 288 Ga. 147, 150(1), 702 S.E.2d 132 (2010)).
92. Id. at 840–41, 851 S.E.2d at 829. (citing O.C.G.A. §§ 19-6-15 (i) (1)(b), (i)(2)(J)(ii)).
93. Id. at 841, 851 S.E.2d at 829–30 (citing § 19-6-15(c)(6)).
94. Id. at 847, 851 S.E.2d at 833 (citing O.C.G.A. § 19-9-3(g) (2021)).
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language of the statute.”95 In contrast to O.C.G.A. § 19-6-2,96 which
authorizes an award of fees in a divorce or alimony case “at any time
during the pendency of the litigation,”97 the plain language of O.C.G.A.
§ 19-9-3(g) authorizes an award to be made at a temporary or final
hearing, and authorizes the inclusion of pre-trial expenses but is silent
as to post-trial costs.98 As such, an award of post-trial litigation expenses
to fund the defense of the appeal was unauthorized.99
V. CUSTODY
A. Modification
Two cases issued during the Survey period addressed a parent’s
intended or actual relocation as evidence of a material change of
circumstance affecting the welfare of the child so as to authorize a
modification of custody.
In Burnham v. Burnham (Burnham II),100 the father sought to modify
custody based on the mother’s planned relocation from Coweta County to
Cobb County.101 The evidence at trial showed that the mother was
moving to Marietta to live with her fiancé and his son, and that her job
was the primary reason for the move. The mother and father had coparented well for the first year after their divorce, and the mother had
allowed the father more than his allotted visitation time with the
children, but she had begun to insist on strict compliance with the
visitation schedule set forth in the parenting plan. The children had lived
in Coweta for their whole lives, and the father had contracted to purchase
a new house in Coweta so that the children would not have to change
school districts after the mother’s move. One of the children had also
experienced behavioral changes as a result of the parties’ divorce and was
concerned about seeing his father less after the relocation.102
The Coweta County Superior Court found that modification was in the
best interests of the children and awarded primary physical custody to
the father.103 The mother appealed, and the Georgia Court of Appeals
95. Id. (citing Viskup v. Viskup, 291 Ga. 103, 106, 727 S.E.2d 97, 100 (2012); Kautter
v. Kautter, 286 Ga. 16, 20, 685 S.E.2d 266, 270 (2009)).
96. O.C.G.A. § 19-6-2 (2021).
97. O.C.G.A. § 19-6-2(a).
98. Day, 357 Ga. App. at 847, 851 S.E.2d at 834 (citing O.C.G.A. § 19-9-3(g)).
99. Id. at 848, 851 S.E.2d at 834.
100. 357 Ga. App. 580, 851 S.E.2d 202 (2020).
101. Id. at 581, 851 S.E.2d at 204.
102. Id. at 582, 851 S.E.2d at 205.
103. Id.
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vacated and remanded the first order because the trial court failed to
address the threshold question of whether a material change of
circumstances had occurred.104 On remand, the trial court made an
express finding of four factors which together constituted a material
change: the reduction in father’s visitation; the mother’s relocation; the
father’s decision to purchase a home in Coweta; and the child’s
enrollment in counseling because of his behavioral changes since the
divorce. The mother appealed, and this time, the court of appeals
affirmed the trial court’s ruling.105 While a parent’s relocation is not in
and of itself sufficient to constitute a material change, the trial court
properly considered a variety of factors and concluded that, together,
they warranted a modification of custody.106
In a factual contrast to Burnham II, the Georgia Court of Appeals in
Brazil v. Williams107 affirmed the Fulton County Superior Court’s order
finding that the father’s relocation from Georgia to Michigan did not rise
to the level of a material change in circumstances authorizing a
modification of custody.108 The parties in Brazil were divorced in Georgia,
and the father was awarded primary physical custody. At the time of the
divorce, the parties lived approximately two hours from each other. The
evidence in the modification action showed that, despite the father’s
move to Michigan, the flight time and travel time for the child to visit
with the mother remained approximately the same as when both parents
lived in Georgia. The trial court concluded, based on these facts, that
there had not been a material change—despite the mother’s arguments,
which were supported by some evidence presented by the guardian ad
litem, that the relocation had caused missed visits and behavioral
changes for the child.109
The court of appeals affirmed the trial court’s finding of no material
change in circumstances because, under the applicable standard of
review, the conclusion was supported by some evidence in the record—
even if that evidence could be characterized as “slight.”110 The court of
appeals also took the opportunity to clarify the meaning and application

104. Id. (citing Burnham v. Burnham, 350 Ga. App. 348, 351, 829 S.E.2d 425, 428
(2019)).
105. Id. at 583–86, ,851 S.E.2d at 205–08.
106. Id. at 584, 851 S.E.2d at 206 (citing Bodne v. Bodne, 277 Ga. 445, 446, 588 S.E.2d
728, 729 (2003); Mahan v. McRae, 241 Ga. App. 109, 112, 522 S.E.2d 772, 775 (1999)).
107. 359 Ga. App. 487, 859 S.E.2d 490 (2021).
108. Id. at 487, 859 S.E.2d 492.
109. Id. at 487–88, 859 S.E.2d at 492.
110. Id. at 491, 859 S.E.2d at 494 (citing Moore v. Wiggins, 230 Ga. 51, 55, 195 S.E.2d
404, 406 (1974)).
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of the Georgia Supreme Court’s ruling in Bodne v. Bodne.111 Contrary to
the mother’s argument, Bodne does not automatically require an inquiry
into the child’s best interests in a relocation case; instead, it “merely
functioned as a rejection of the presumption that the custodial parent has
a prima facie right to retain custody of the child in relocation cases.”112
1. Parenting Plans
In Brown v. Brown,113 the Georgia Court of Appeals reversed the trial
court’s denial of the mother’s request for declaratory judgment in a
dispute over the application of the parties’ parenting plan.114 The plan
provided, in pertinent part, that each parent would be entitled to “two
consecutive weeks of uninterrupted parenting time” with the children
during their summer vacation.115 The parties had historically deviated
from this requirement and selected nonconsecutive dates by agreement,
but when the parties were unable to agree on dates in 2019, the mother
insisted that they follow the strict language of the plan. When the father
refused to do so, the mother sought a declaratory judgment stating the
father must select his summer vacation dates as one two-week block of
consecutive days.116
The father maintained throughout the litigation that, while he did not
dispute the language of the parenting plan, he disagreed with the
requirement that he choose his days consecutively because the parties
had historically deviated from that requirement.117 At the final hearing,
the father’s counsel stated that they did not contest the declaratory
judgment but disagreed, based upon the parties’ historical practice, that
he was required to select consecutive days. The trial court denied the
declaratory judgment following the hearing, reasoning that the
parenting plan allowed the parties “up to” two consecutive weeks but did
not require them to actually exercise two consecutive weeks and did not
require them to select their summer vacation time in weeks instead of
days. Additionally, the trial court assessed attorney’s fees against the

111. 277 Ga. 445, 588 S.E.2d 728 (2003).
112. 359 Ga. App. at 489, 859 S.E.2d at 493 (citing Bodne, 277 Ga. at 447, 588 S.E.2d at
729).
113. 359 Ga. App. 511, 857 S.E.2d 505 (2021).
114. Id. at 511, 857 S.E.2d at 507. The mother also sought temporary and permanent
modification of custody; temporary modification was denied after a hearing, and the mother
abandoned the request for permanent modification of the parenting plan.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 511–12, 857 S.E.2d at 508.
117. Id. at 513, 857 S.E.2d at 509.
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mother under O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14(b)118 based upon her pursuit of the
declaratory judgment and under O.C.G.A. § 19-9-3(g). The mother
appealed.119
The court of appeals reversed the trial court’s denial of declaratory
judgment and award of attorney’s fees under O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14(b), and
vacated and remanded the fee award under O.C.G.A. § 19-9-3(g).120 The
court of appeals held that despite the father’s continued insistence that
he did not dispute or contest the language of the parenting plan, the
father’s continued refusal to comply with its requirements evidenced a
legitimate dispute as to its meaning such that declaratory judgment was
proper.121 Additionally, the trial court’s conclusion that the parties were
entitled to take up to two consecutive weeks but were not required to
select their dates in week-long blocks reflected an interpretation of the
parenting plan different than that urged by the mother.122 Thus, the
declaratory judgment presented a justiciable controversy, and the motion
should have been granted.123 Based upon this ruling, the court of appeals
also reversed the award of attorney’s fees under O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14(b).124
Since the declaratory judgment action was proper, it was neither
substantially vexatious or lacking substantial justification.125 The court
of appeals vacated and remanded the award of attorney’s fees under
O.C.G.A. § 19-9-3(g) to ensure that the award did not include fees
incurred in connection with the declaratory judgment, which are not
contemplated as recoverable under that code section.126
The court of appeals’ opinion in Pryce v. Pryce127 highlighted the
importance of compliance with the statutory requirements of parenting
plans. There, the decree awarded joint legal and primary physical
custody of the minor children to the husband and directed the parties to
consult regarding major decisions, with the husband’s decision
controlling if they were unable to agree. It provided that the party with
physical custody would be in charge of day-to-day decisions. The wife was
granted reasonable visitation as the parties could agree and set forth a
visitation schedule if they could not agree. Finally, the decree granted

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14(b) (2021).
Brown, 359 Ga. App. at 516, 857 S.E.2d at 510.
Id. at 520–23, 857 S.E.2d at 513–14.
Id. at 517–20, 857 S.E.2d at 511–13.
Id. at 519, 857 S.E.2d at 512.
Id. at 520, 857 S.E.2d at 513.
Id.
Id. at 521, 857 S.E.2d at 513 (citing O.C.G.A. § 9-15-14(b) (2021)).
Id. at 523, 857 S.E.2d at 514–15.
359 Ga. App. 590, 859 S.E.2d 554 (2021).

104

MERCER LAW REVIEW

Vol. 73

each parent access to the children’s medical and educational records and
directed the children’s schools to release the children into the custody of
either parent. It did not include or incorporate a parenting plan and did
not include additional guidance regarding custody and visitation. Among
other enumerations of error, the husband argued that the Cobb County
Superior Court erred in failing to incorporate a full parenting plan. The
court of appeals agreed.128 Unless otherwise ordered by the court, the
plan must include:
(A) A recognition that a close and continuing parent-child relationship
and continuity in the child’s life will be in the child’s best interest; (B)
A recognition that the child’s needs will change and grow as the child
matures and demonstrate that the parents will make an effort to
parent that takes this issue into account so that future modifications
to the parenting plan are minimized; (C) A recognition that a parent
with physical custody will make day-to-day decisions and emergency
decisions while the child is residing with such parent; and (D) That
both parents will have access to all of the child’s records and
information, including, but not limited to, education, health, health
insurance, extracurricular activities, and religious communications.129

Additionally,
[U]nless otherwise ordered by the court or agreed upon by the parties,
the parenting plan “shall include, but not be limited to” the following:
when a child will be in each parent’s physical care, how holidays and
school breaks will be spent with each parent, transportation
arrangements, whether supervision will be needed for parenting time,
an allocation of decision-making authority and what, if any,
limitations exist while one parent has physical custody in terms of the
other parent contacting the child.130

The court’s failure to include these elements required the court of
appeals to vacate and remand the judgment.131 Similarly, in VanVlerah
v. VanVlerah,132 the trial court awarded joint legal custody to both
parents and primary physical custody to the mother, with the father
having supervised visitation.133 The divorce decree did not include or
reference a parenting plan and contained none of the elements discussed

128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.

Id.
Id. at 591–92, 859 S.E.2d at 556–57 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 19-9-1(b)(1) (2021)).
Id. (quoting O.C.G.A § 19-9-1(b)(2)).
Id. at 593, 859 S.E.2d at 557.
359 Ga. App. 577, 859 S.E.2d 546 (2021)).
Id. at 578, 859 S.E.2d at 549.
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above. The Georgia Court of Appeals determined that the Jefferson
County Superior Court’s total failure to include any elements required by
the statute required that the award be vacated.134 It is imperative that
litigants and advocates be mindful of the statutory requirements for
parenting plans if they hope to avoid the risk of custody awards being
vacated and remanded on appeal.
2. Contempt and Visitation
Perhaps the more significant ruling in VanVlerah concerned the
father’s allegations of contempt against the mother for failure to follow
the visitation schedule during the early months of the COVID-19
pandemic.135 A temporary order provided that the father would have
supervised visitation with the children in Michigan, where the children
lived with the mother. The father exercised this visitation in December
2019 and January and February of 2020, but the only supervised
visitation center in the county that satisfied the requirements of the
order temporarily shut down in March 2020 due to the pandemic. When
it reopened, the mother declined to schedule a supervised visit out of
concern for the health and safety of the children between April and July
2020. She agreed to resume scheduling in August 2020, but the father
filed an action for contempt before any August visitation had occurred.136
The trial court found that the mother had violated the visitation order,
but the violation was not willful so as to authorize a finding of contempt
“due to the state of the pandemic, and fear that has gripped a large
portion of the Nation,” and her concerns were “realistic and fueled by the
media and guidelines in the State of Michigan.”137 The court of appeals
affirmed the trial court’s ruling because some evidence supported the
conclusion that the mother’s violation was not willful.138 As the court of
appeals acknowledged, there is some existing authority excusing
violation of court orders for custody and visitation based upon fear for the
safety of the children.139 This represents the first such appellate decision
applying that rule in the context of the national public health crisis
caused by COVID-19.

134. Id. at 578–80, 859 S.E.2d at 549–50 (citing O.C.G.A. § 19-9-1(b); Mashburn v.
Mashburn, 353 Ga. App. 31, 48, 836 S.E.2d 131, 146 (2019)).
135. Id. at 581–82, 859 S.E.2d at 551.
136. Id. at 582–83, 859 S.E.2d at 551–52.
137. Id. at 583, 859 S.E.2d at 552.
138. Id. at 583–84, 859 S.E.2d at 552–53 (citing Cousin I, 353 Ga. App. at 875, 840
S.E.2d at 90).
139. Id. at 584–85, 859 S.E.2d at 553. See, e.g, Beckham v. O’Brien, 176 Ga. App. 518,
522, 336 S.E.2d 375, 377 (1985).
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3. Third-Party Custody
Two third-party custody disputes before the Georgia Court of Appeals
during the Survey period raised questions about the potential application
of Georgia’s recent “equitable caregiver” statute, although neither
actually applied nor interpreted it.140
In Steedley v. Gilbreth (Steedley III),141 the Georgia Court of Appeals
reversed the Clinch County Superior Court’s award of joint custody
between the child’s mother and maternal grandmother.142 In a prior
appeal, Steedley II,143 the Georgia Court of Appeals vacated the trial
court’s award of temporary custody to the grandmother.144 Following
remand, the trial court awarded primary physical custody to the mother,
but granted visitation to the grandmother and required the mother and
grandmother to work together for the best interests of the child and to
cooperate on weekends and holidays. While the court did not use the
phrase “joint custody,” the court of appeals construed the award as
granting joint custody.145 The court of appeals reversed this award.146
While Georgia law permits sole legal custody to be awarded to a third
party, no statutory authority permits an award of joint legal custody
between a fit parent and a third party.147 The authors of this article
respectfully posit that Georgia’s “equitable caregiver statute” actually
could be read to permit a joint award: O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3.1(g) provides
that, once a third-party has established standing to be adjudicated as an
equitable caregiver, “[t]he court may enter an order as appropriate to
establish parental rights and responsibilities for such individual,
including, but not limited to, custody or visitation.”148 Whether such an
outcome would be consistent with the well-established constitutional
rights of parents, the settled legal authority of this state, and the
intentions of the legislature is another question altogether.
Wallace v. Chandler149 involved a custody dispute between the
incarcerated mother of a minor child and the child’s non-relative foster

140. O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3.1 (2021).
141. 359 Ga. App. 551, 859 S.E.2d 520 (2021).
142. Id. at 552, 859 S.E.2d at 522.
143. 352 Ga. App. 179, 834 S.E.2d 301 (2019).
144. Steedly III, 359 Ga. App. 551, 859 S.E.2d 520. See Steedly II, 352 Ga. App. at 179,
834 S.E.2d at 302).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 19-9-3).
148. O.C.G.A. § 19-7-3.1(g).
149. 360 Ga. App. 541, 859 S.E.2d 100 (2021).
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parents.150 The child was placed in the care of the foster parents on a
temporary basis, and the foster parents filed a petition for sole custody
while the child’s mother was incarcerated. The mother did not respond
to the petition, and following a hearing at which only the foster parents
and their attorney appeared, the Catoosa County Superior Court entered
an order granting sole custody to the foster parents as the child’s “fictive
kin.” The mother filed a motion to set aside the judgment, alleging inter
alia that the foster parents did not have standing, as non-relatives, to
seek sole custody under O.C.G.A. § 19-7-1.151 The trial court denied the
motion to set aside, and the court of appeals reversed that denial.152
Because O.C.G.A. § 19-7-1(b)(1) specifically limits standing to seek
custody to certain specific classes of relatives, the foster parents did not
have statutory standing.153 However, the court of appeals noted that the
foster parents “were not without redress,” and specifically suggested that
the equitable caregiver statute (which was not in effect at the time of the
initial filing of the custody petition) could have offered them an avenue
by which to obtain standing to seek custody.154
VI. POST JUDGMENT RELIEF
Greenlee v. Tideback155 examined the equitable doctrine of judicial
estoppel. The parties were a same sex couple who divorced in 2017.156
The parties’ settlement agreement provided, in relevant part, that the
parties would share joint legal custody of their two minor children and
Greenlee would be the primary physical custodian. The trial court
granted the parties a divorce incorporating the settlement agreement
and parenting plan.157
Tideback filed a modification two years after the divorce was
finalized.158 Greenlee answered and moved to set aside all provisions in
the parties’ final judgment and decree which awarded custody rights of
the two children to Tideback on the grounds that Tideback “was not a
biological or adoptive parent of the children.”159 The Henry County

150. Id. at 541, 859 S.E2d at 101.
151. Id. at 542, 859 S.E2d at 102 (citing O.C.G.A § 19-7-1 (2021)).
152. Id.
153. Id. at 543, 859 S.E2d at 103 (citing O.C.G.A. § 19-7-1(b)(1) (2021); Clarke v. Wade,
273 Ga. 587, 597, 544 S.E.2d 99, 107 (2001)).
154. Id. at 103–04 (citing § 19-7-3.1(b)(1) (2021)).
155. 359 Ga. App. 295, 857 S.E.2d 276 (2021).
156. Id. at 295–96, 857 S.E.2d at 276.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 296, 857 S.E.2d at 277.
159. Id.

108

MERCER LAW REVIEW

Vol. 73

Superior Court denied the motion, reasoning that judicial estoppel
prevented Greenlee from now claiming that no children were born of the
marriage.160
“The federal doctrine of judicial estoppel precludes a party from
asserting a position in one judicial proceeding after having successfully
asserted a contrary position in a prior proceeding[.]”161 The Supreme
Court of the United States analyzes three relevant factors when deciding
whether to apply judicial estoppel to a case, which Georgia has followed:
(1) [T]he party’s position must be clearly inconsistent with its earlier
position;
(2) [T]he party must have succeeded in persuading a court to accept
the party’s earlier position; absent success in a prior proceeding, a
party’s later inconsistent position introduced no risk of inconsistent
court determinations, and thus poses little threat to judicial integrity;
and
(3) [W]hether the party seeking to assert an inconsistent position
would derive an unfair advantage or impose an unfair detriment on
the opposing party if not estopped.162

The court of appeals held that the trial court properly applied the
doctrine of judicial estoppel to preclude Greenlee from taking a position
contrary to that she had asserted two years prior.163
The parties in Paul v. Paul164 were divorced on November 5, 2015. On
November 2, 2018, the wife filed a motion to vacate the final decree
alleging that the husband had failed to reveal assets during the divorce,
and she would not have entered the settlement agreement knowing of
said assets.165 The husband filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that the
wife’s motion should have been filed as a new action, and that service
was not proper on his divorce attorney. The trial court granted the
husband’s motion and dismissed the case; the wife appealed.166

160. Id.
161. Id. at 297, 857 S.E.2d at 277 (quoting D’Antignac v. Deere & Co., 342 Ga. App. 771,
773–74, 804 S.E.2d 688, 690 (2017)).
162. Id. (quoting D’Antignac, 342 Ga. App. at 774, 804 S.E.2d at 691).
163. Id.
164. 355 Ga. App. 828, 846 S.E.2d 138 (2020).
165. Id. at 828, 846 S.E.2d at 140 (citing O.C.G.A. § 9-11-60(d)(2) (2021)).
166. Id. at 829, 846 S.E.2d at 140–41.
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The Georgia Court of Appeals held that under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-60,167 a
judgment must be directly attacked by motion in the rendering court.168
Therefore, the wife properly filed her motion to vacate or set aside the
decree. Further, the wife properly served her motion on the husband’s
attorney. The attorney was still actively representing the husband in his
family law litigation, and there was no question that the attorney
received the motion. There was no merit to the husband’s argument that
personal service was required since the motion was filed in a later term
of court that the decree was entered. In order to close a civil case, the
petitioner in the case must file a civil case disposition form pursuant to
O.C.G.A. § 9-11-58(b).169 The husband had failed to file the civil case
disposition form, leaving the judgment open to a motion to set aside.
Family law practitioners representing petitioners must remember to file
civil case disposition forms or risk leaving the judgment open to attack.
Chief Judge McFadden concurred fully in part and specially in part,
stating that service under O.C.G.A. § 9-11-60(f) was the correct standard
in this case.170 He did not agree that the case was still open due to the
lack of the civil case disposition form.171 O.C.G.A. § 9-11-60(f) simply
requires that reasonable notice shall be given upon the filing of the
motion, a standard that the wife met.
VII. LEGISLATIVE UPDATES
House Bill 154, Act 140 (May 3, 2021), revises, clarifies, and expands
the procedural and substantive protections available to foster and
adopted children in certain court proceedings. This bill, effective July 1,
2021, amends O.C.G.A. §§ 19-8-2, 19-8-3, 19-8-5, 19-8-9, 19-8-10, 19-8-11,
19-8-12, 19-8-13, 19-8-14, 19-8-16, 19-8-18, 19-8-24, 19-8-26, and
29-4-10.172
House Bill 231, Act 273 (May 10, 2021), enacts Chapter 19–13A of the
Official Code of Georgia Annotated and significantly expands the
protections available to victims of stalking and dating violence in this
state.173 O.C.G.A. § 19-13A-1174 defines “dating relationship” and “dating

167. O.C.G.A. § 9-11-60 (2021).
168. Id. at 830, 846 S.E.2d at 141 (citing Zepp v. Toporek, 211 Ga. App. 169, 171, 438
S.E.2d 636, 639 (1993)).
169. See O.C.G.A. § 9-11-58(b) (2021).
170. Id. at 832–33, 846 S.E.2d at 143 (citing O.C.G.A § 9-11-5 (2021)) (McFadden, C.J.,
concurring fully and specially).
171. Id. at 833, 846 S.E.2d at 143 (McFadden, C.J., concurring fully and specially).
172. Ga. H.R. Bill 154, Reg. Sess. (2021).
173. Ga. H.R. Bill 231, Reg. Sess. (2021).
174. O.C.G.A. § 19-13A-1 (2021).
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violence,” and subsequent code sections provide for the issuance of a
protective order consistent with the existing framework for domestic
violence and stalking protective orders to victims of dating violence as
defined in the new statutes. O.C.G.A. § 16-5-94175 was also amended to
include the newly enacted statues within the provisions governing the
issuance of a protective order.
On May 10, 2021, the State Legislature passed Senate Bill 234, Act
268, establishing the Georgia Uniform Mediation Act effective July 1,
2021.176 This act enacts Chapter 9–17 of the Official Code of Georgia
Annotated, and sets forth certain uniform definitions, requirements,
restrictions, and privileges, including with respect to confidentiality,
waiver, and disclosure, applicable to mediations conducted in this
State.177 In light of the growing trend towards alternative dispute
resolution in domestic relations actions across the state, including many
courts which require mediation before they will set a hearing in nonemergency situations, it is incumbent upon family law practitioners (and
neutrals) to familiarize themselves with the provisions of this new
uniform law.

175. O.C.G.A. § 16-5-94 (2021).
176. Ga. S. Bill 234, Reg. Sess. (2021).
177. O.C.G.A. §§ 9-17-1 to 9-17-14.

